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In this paper we derive a joint continuous/censored demand system suitable for 
the analysis of commodity demand relationships using panel data.  Unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled for using a correlated random effects specification and a 
Generalized Method of Moments framework used to estimate the model in two stages.  
While relatively small differences in elasticity estimates are found between a flexible 
specification and one that restricts the relationship between the random effect and budget 
shares to be time invariant, larger differences are observed between the most flexible 
random effects model and a pooled cross sectional estimator.  The results suggest the 
limited ability of such estimators to control for preference heterogeneity and unit value 
endogeneity leads to parameter bias.   
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 Introduction 
Our understanding of how public policy instruments such as taxes, subsidies, and 
social programs impact consumer behavior has been greatly enhanced by the expanding 
availability of comprehensive microeconomic data, yet full exploitation of the data for 
policy analysis is often hampered by the arduous econometric techniques required to 
extract vital information.  In particular, the high proportion of zero expenditure levels for 
individual commodities makes it difficult to estimate large, theoretically consistent 
disaggregated consumer demand models.  The two principle reasons for zero 
expenditures in microeconomic data are households at a corner solution for the 
commodity in question, and limited survey periods leading to infrequency of purchase 
(IFP) errors.  Because of the basis for the former in economic theory and the recent 
proliferation of survey data designed to mitigate the latter, most of the econometric 
techniques developed thus far are designed to model economic non-consumption. 
Much of the recent empirical research on censored demand systems has focused 
on developing computationally feasible estimation techniques that circumvent the “curse 
of dimensionality” associated with the theoretically consistent models proposed by Wales 
and Woodland and Lee and Pitt (1986, 1987).  For example, Shonkwiler and Yen develop 
an improved two-step approach that is general enough to model IFP errors as well as 
other processes generating zero expenditures.  Nonetheless, its application to corner 
solutions has been criticized by Arndt, Lui, and Preckel for an inability to account for the 
role of reservation prices.  Instead, Arndt proposes the use of maximum entropy (ME) 
techniques to address this shortcoming and generate a simpler framework for the 
imposition of coherency conditions.  Limiting this estimator’s feasibility, however, is the 
fact that its asymptotic properties are unknown in non-linear applications such as the 
censored demand problem.  
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More recently, Perali and Chavas have developed a consistent approach to the 
problem based on generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques, while Yen, Lin, 
and Smallwood formulate a quasi-maximum likelihood approach they claim is more 
efficient in small to moderately sized samples.  Although all of the above approaches 
provide a means of obtaining consistent estimates of disaggregated demand models, they 
are designed for cross sectional data, which suffers from a number of shortcomings.  
Chief among these are the limited ability to control for heterogeneous preferences and 
lack of significant real price variation. 
Therefore, we develop a methodology for consistently estimating large, 
theoretically plausible longitudinal censored demand systems using a GMM framework 
similar to that employed by Perali and Chavas.  The estimator is able to exploit the 
greater price, expenditure, and demographic variability of panel data, and provides a 
means to reduce bias through more effective controls for household-level heterogeneity 
and unit value endogeneity.  In order to determine the sensitivity of price and income 
elasticities from censored demand systems to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, 
we first implement the longitudinal estimator on a three-year panel data set from 
Romania and then compare the elasticity estimates to those that result when a more 
restrictive random effects specification is assumed and when the panel is pooled to create 
a large cross section. 
Specification and Estimation 
Theoretical and Empirical Specification          
In accordance with the random utility hypothesis (RUH, McFadden), define the 
direct utility function as  ) , ; , ( j jt jt jt c a q U ε , where  T t ,..., 1 =  indexes time periods, 
J j ,..., 1 =  indexes households,  ) ,..., ( 1 ′ = Njt jt jt q q q  is a vector containing household j’s   3
demand levels for the N commodity groups in time period t,  ) ,..., ( 1 ′ = Njt jt jt ε ε ε  is a 
vector of random disturbances distributed  ) , 0 (
2
ε σ N ,  ) ,..., ( 1 ′ = Ljt jt jt a a a  is a vector of L 
household demographic variables (not all of which are time varying), and  j c  is a time 
invariant household specific effect representing unobserved heterogeneity across 
households.TP
1
PT  If it is further assumed  )     (⋅ U represents a preference ordering of the 
PIGLOG class, then consumer maximization of utility leads to the familiar cost function 
corresponding to Deaton and Muellbauer’s Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS);  
∑ ∑ ∏ ∑∑
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where  jt u  is a reference level of utility and  kt p  is the price of good k in time t.  Since the 
household specific effect is akin to a collection of unobserved demographic variables, it 
is included in the empirical specification via demographic translating (Pollack and 
Wales) like the observed demographics.  The random disturbance terms are also 
translated into the cost function to maintain consistency with the RUH.  
  Inverting (1) to obtain the indirect utility function and applying Roy’s Identity 
produces the following Marshallian uncompensated demand functions in budget share 
form: 
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   The most flexible specification of equations (2) and (3) possible allows all of the 
estimable parameters to vary over time.  For large, comprehensive demand systems, 
however, it is unlikely the resulting parameter set could be precisely estimated, and 
economic conditions may not require such parameter flexibility.  The estimation 
approach detailed in the next section allows us to focus on a sub-set of the estimable 
parameters and leave the others unrestricted.  Because there are no historical events 
during the sample period that suggest structural change in demand patterns, we assume 
that the coefficients on the economic variables (prices and total expenditure) are stable 
and time invariant.  Nonetheless, the intercept of each share equation is allowed to vary 
over time to capture changes on macroeconomic conditions that may influence the 
structure of demand. 
Since the observed demographic variables are not of primary interest and included 
in the model only as controls, their coefficients are left unrestricted.  Indeed, little is 
know about the temporal relationship between demand patterns and measured 
demographics, and there are many situations warranting this flexibility.  Similarly, the 
household specific effect contains a time varying coefficient, leading to a more flexible 
specification than is typically found in applied work, where the fixed effects specification 
is frequently used to account for unobserved heterogeneity in linear models.  Fixed 
effects implicitly constrains  t n nt ,      1 ∀ = δ , but if this restriction is invalid and the fixed 
effect is correlated with the model’s regressors, parameter estimates of the slope 
coefficients will be biased.  One of the advantages of the GMM approach used below is 
that it allows explicit testing of such restrictions. 
Another common method for modeling unobserved heterogeneity using panel 
data is the random effects approach, which treats  j c  as a component of the disturbance term and uses GLS to estimate the model.  In order for random effects estimators to 
produce unbiased estimates, the random effect must be orthogonal to model’s regressors, 
an assumption that cannot be made in general.  Rarely do surveys contain the exogenous 
market prices called for in theory, rather, prices are often computed as unit values, where 
the household’s expenditures on a certain item are divided by the physical quantity 
purchased.  These unit values are correlated to the household’s preferences for goods of 
different quality, and consequently, with the household specific effect.  Furthermore, it is 
possible that   is correlated with the observable demographic variables in the model.  j c
The nonlinear methods required to estimate censored demand equations lead to 
additional issues that must be addressed when applying fixed or random effects models, 
which are summarized by Jakubson (1988) in the context of labor supply.  Although 
fixed effects estimation places no distributional requirements on the form of the 
unobserved heterogeneity, it is consistent only when the time series dimension of the 
panel is large.  By contrast, random effects requires one assume the household specific 
effect follows a specified distribution, but is consistent in short panels.  Because the data 
series used in our analysis contains only three time periods, consistency of the parameter 
estimates can only be achieved through the random effects approach.  However, we find 
that single equation Hausman tests (Greene, p.576) conducted on the non-censored 
equations reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the random effect with the 
regressors.       
In order to incorporate the correlation of the random effect with the regressors 
into the estimating equation, we employ a specification developed by Jakubson (1988) 
for single equation Tobit estimation on panel data, based of previous work by 
Chamberlain in the linear (1982) and probit context (1984).  This correlation is modeled 
as a linear projection of   on all the right hand side variables:    j c
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ljt lt j x p a c υ λ λ λ + + + = ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ log log
3 2 1 ,                     (4) 
where  j υ is assumed to be independent of both the exogenous regressors and  njt ε ~ , 
D
jt x  is 
expenditure deflated by an appropriate price index, and  j υ  is distributed  ) , 0 (
2
υ σ N .  For 
notational convenience, define 
D
t t t t x p a x log | log | ′ ′ = ′  as a row vector of length 
) 1 ( + + N L  that includes all the regressors in (2) less the intercept.TP
2
PT  Jakubson notes there 
are certain cases in which the assumption of independence between  j υ  and 
T x x ′ ′ = ′ ,..., 1 x  may be invalid.  For example, since the effect of the regressors outside 
the sampling period is contained in  j υ , if x′ exhibits strong serial correlation, the 
independence assumption is violated. When the expression in (4) is used to integrate the 
household specific effect out of the demand equations, the resulting demand system 
disturbances are normally distributed,  heteroscedatic within each equation, and 
correlated across equations through both the  s ' ε  and υ.TP
3
PT    
  In order to linearize the above budget share equations and reduce the potential for 
severe multicollinearity between the AIDS price index and the rest of the specification, 
we replace (2) with a scale-invariant log linear Laspeyres index, which has been shown 
by Moschini and Buse to have good approximation properties.  This index is equivalent 




t p s P log log 0 when  0 k s  is 
calculated for some base level.  Following substitution of the price index and random 
effect specification into (1), the reduced form linearized AIDS model (LAIDS) can be 
written as  
              njt nT jT n j n j njt njt u x x x s + ′ + + ′ + ′ + = π π π α ... 2 2 1 1                    (5) 
 
where ) ,..., ( 1 ′ ′ ′ = nT n nt π π π  is the reduced form parameter vector of demand equation n in 
time period t.  Note that the regressors from all time periods enter the reduced form 
demand equations through their correlation with the random effect.  If the N demand   7
equations are partitioned into a subset  1 N  containing the uncensored equations, and a 
subset  2 N  containing censored equations, then the system of demands in  1 N  can be 
estimated consistently via equation-by-equation OLS.   
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and estimated efficiently as a system of correlated Tobit equations.  Since joint estimation 
requires the evaluation of  T N2  dimension normal integrals, which is infeasible for large 
T N2 , a consistent approach is adopted to obtain the reduced form parameters using 
equation-by-equation Tobit estimation.  Without accounting for the heteroscedasticity in 
nt u , however, these parameter estimates will be biased and inconsistent (e.g., Pudney, 
p.148), so a modification to the conventional Tobit is necessary.  A fairly general way of 
modeling the heteroscedasticity is to specify 
2 2 2 2 ) exp( ) ( ) ( nt jt nt nt njt w w u E ζ σ σ ′ = = , where 
jt w  is a vector of length R of exogenous variables responsible for unequal dispersion of 
the individual error terms,  nt ζ  is a R-vector of estimable parameters, and 
2
nt σ  is an 
estimable common parameter in the covariance matrix. 
  Stacking the equations in (5) and (6) over time sequentially by good defines a 
system of NT continuous/censored demand equations with correlated disturbances and the 
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where 
      n n n T n T nN T n t nL t n nL n n σ λ δ α | |     | | } { } { | | 1 1 2 1 ζ I I I diag diag η Π ′ + = β γ γ η η L L ,     (8)   8
n α  is a  1 × T  vector of intercepts, 
1 nL η is a  1 L T ×  matrix of coefficients on the  1 L  time 
invariant observable demographic variables,  } { nlt η diag  are  T T ×  matrices corresponding 
to the coefficients on the  2 L  time varying observable demographic variables,  T I  is a 
T T ×  identity matrix,  n δ  is a  1 × T  vector of parameters multiplying the household 








11 T NT LT λ λ λ λ λ λ λ = ′  is a  T N L ) 1 ( 1 + + ×  vector of 
parameters from the correlated random effect specification,  n ζ  is a  R T ×  matrix of 
parameters in the heteroscedastic error specification, and  n σ  is a  1 × T  vector variance 
parameters.TP
4
PT  While (8) represents the hypothesized structure of the underlying system, 
other specifications are possible and will be tested against this one is the next section.  
Finally, note that the δ  parameters are only identified up to a scale factor, requiring the 
following normalization in the first time period:   n n ∀ =    1 1 δ . 
One advantage of the GMM estimator developed below is that it allows the 
dimensions of the estimation problem to be reduced by focusing on a subset of 
parameters while leaving the others unrestricted (Chamberlain, 1984).  Since the primary 
objective of this study is to calculate price and expenditure elasticities for the censored 
and uncensored commodities, we need only identify the coefficients of prices and total 
expenditure and the univariat variance parameters for the censored equations.  Therefore, 
let 
∗ Π  be the  T R N NT ) 2 ( + + ×  reduced from coefficient matrix that excludes the 
columns containing the demographic coefficients and intercepts, and transform it into 
vector of length NTK as  ) (
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R N K  and the zeros in 
the ζ  parameter sub-matrix have been removed from the π vector. 
Generalized Method of Moments Estimation Framework          
It is possible to derive a consistent asymptotically normal efficient estimator 
based on the marginal distributions of the data in cases where the joint likelihood   9
function can be written down in theory, but not calculated directly.  This approach, 
developed by White and generalized by Jakubson (1998), called quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimation (QMLE) relies on a method of moments framework to approximate 
joint ML.TP
5
PT  QMLE can be broken down into two stages, with the first involving 
consistent estimation of the reduced form parameters using OLS on the non-censored 
equations and heteroscedastic Tobit estimation on the censored equations.  The second 
stage entails using minimum distance techniques (Malinvaud) to impose restrictions on 
the reduced form parameter estimates, including those necessary to identify the structural 




A critical piece of the minimum distance estimator is the metric used to measure 
the distance between the sample and population moments.  It is widely agreed the proper 
norm is the inverse covariance matrix of 
∗ Π ˆ  (Jakubson, 1986), however, this matrix must 
be calculated taking into account the fact that 
∗ Π ˆ  is estimated from the marginal 
distributions of the time period and good-specific demand equations and not through the 
joint likelihood function.  A detailed derivation of this  NTK NTK × covariance matrix is 
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) ,..., ( 1 1 ′ ′ ′ = NjT j j S S S  denotes the vector of univariate scores for all NT equations, and  njt H  
the univariate hessian for demand equation n in time period t, then 





− − − = NjT j E E H H diag D and  ) ( 2 j jS S E ′ = D .  A consistent estimator of Ω is 
obtained by replacing the population moments by their sample counterparts.  The 
minimum distance estimator can then be constructed as  
    )] ( ˆ [ ˆ ] ) ( ˆ [ ) ( min 
1 ψ h π ψ h π ψ − ′ − =
− Ω D ,                        (9) 
where ψ  is a Q-vector of structural parameters (Q<NTK) and  ) (⋅ h  is a non-linear 
function mapping ψ  into π.  This function is used to impose the demand theory   10
restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity on the reduced form and identify the 
parameterized random effect.  It’s Jacobian  ψ
ψ
′ ∂
∂ ) ( h  has full column rank equal to Q.   
Under the null hypothesis that the restrictions imposed by  ) (⋅ h  are correct,  ) ˆ (ψ JD  is a 
chi-squared distributed random variable with df = Q NTK − .  This Wald statistic can be 
used to formulate tests (nested and non-nested) of the underlying specification of 
structural parameters. 
Data and Results           
Data used in the estimation of the joint continuous/censored demand system are 
drawn from the nationally and regionally representative 1994-96 Romanian Integrated 
Household Survey (RIHS).  The RIHS contains three individual cross sections composed 
of 24,523 households in 1994, 31,558 households in 1995, and 32,013 households in 
1996, as well as an embedded panel data set of 6,940 households.  Although we estimate 
the censored demand system only on the panel of households, the entire cross sections are 
used to compute cluster prices.  Monthly market prices are approximated in each of the 
survey’s forty-seven ‘judets’ (counties) by the median unit value calculated from the 
sample of purchasing households, and deflated using a composite food, nonfood, and 
services CPI.  In rare cases where no households in a given judet purchase a commodity 
in the specified month, the median unit value is computed across a larger region and/or 
longer time period.TP
7
PT   
When unit values are used to approximate market prices they are susceptible to 
endogeneity bias due to measurement error and quality effects, a deficiency that has been 
addressed by several studies in the context of uncensored equation systems (Deaton; 
Crawford, Laisney, and Preston).  Our use of median unit values computed at the judet 
level to approximate prices has the potential to reduce measurement error, provided the number of households in each county is sufficiently large (Deaton, p. 294).  Indeed, Kedir 
has found evidence using a much smaller urban data sample from Ethiopia that the 
difference between uncorrected and measurement error corrected own-price elasticity 
estimates seems to diminish, while the quality correction becomes relatively more 
important, as cluster size increases.  However, the fact that the medians are computed 
over the sample of purchasing households leads to the possibility of selection bias, which 
we do not correct.
8  One advantage of our model over cross sectional estimators is that it 
provides a reasonable way to control for the endogeneity of unit values due to quality 
effects through their correlation with the random effect.  
Total consumption expenditure is computed by aggregating information on food, 
nonfood goods and services, collected over a one-month period, or a retrospective one-
year time frame in the case of durables.  For many households, especially in rural areas, a 
significant share of food consumption is derived from own production, in-kind payments, 
and gifts.  These are valued at household specific open market price if the household 
purchases some of the own-consumed product in the market, and the regional market 
price if the household makes no market purchases of the product.  Monetized home 
consumption is then added to purchased food, nonfood goods, services, and the flow of 
services from durable goods (based on a constant ten-year depreciation schedule) to 
create the total consumption expenditure variable.   
The RIHS contains a wealth of demographic information that is exploited to 
control for heterogeneity across households.  These include eight regional locators, four 
seasonal indicators, and the following household composition variables:  The number of 
young children in the household between the ages of zero and four, the number age five 
through seventeen, and the number of adults eighteen years of age or older.  In addition, 
characteristics of the household head are used as household level preference controls, 
  11including the head’s age, an indicator of whether the head is female, and four dummy 
variables denoting educational attainment at either the primary level, lower secondary or 
technical school, upper secondary, or university/college level. 
Table 1 lists the average budget shares and percentage of zero expenditures for 
each commodity group in the demand system.  The grouping of goods in the model is 
primarily policy driven, as commodities subject to differential value added (VAT) or 
excise tax rates during Romania’s transition are all treated separately.  Nevertheless, 
every attempt was made to place goods that are close substitutes in the same group 
whenever possible, in accordance with the composite commodity theorem.  The fact that 
the budget shares of each commodity vary little from 1994 through 1996 lends credence 
to our assertion that the structure of commodity demand in Romania was stable during 
this period.
9
The degree of censoring is naturally much higher for the individual commodities 
(with the exception of bread) than larger commodity groups, which are also generally 
composed of necessities and staple foods.  As noted by Perali and Chavas as well as 
Pudney, instances of zero expenditure levels due to non-consumption are more likely in 
developing countries than wealthier societies.  The same is true of transition countries, 
such as Romania, where many households live below the poverty line and the removal of 
communist-era price subsidies has lead to large real price increases during the transition 
period.
10  In addition, the survey period of the RIHS is long enough to make the 
possibility of systematic IFP errors in the data remote, so most of the observed zero 
expenditure levels are attributable to economic non-consumption. 
  12  13
Specification Tests 
Although the theoretical derivation of the censored demand equations from a 
random utility function implies the error terms of the estimating equations are 
heteroscedastic, it is advisable to confirm the implications of the theory empirically 
before corrective action is taken.  Following the approach detailed in Greene (p.914), we 
construct a Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic under the assumption that the unequal 
dispersion of error terms is related to household size and the log of total expenditures.  
The tests indicate the regression disturbances are heteroscedastic in all of the equations 
expect that of gasoline and diesel fuel, so a conventional rather than heteroscedastic Tobit 
model is specified for this commodity group.  
  It is also possible to test whether the data generating process is consistent with 
more parsimonious specifications of the random effect.  For example, fixed effect models 
typically make the implicit assumption that  t n nt ,    1 ∀ = δ , while most nonlinear 
applications of the random effects approach impose the additional restriction that all the 
λ  parameters are equal to zero.  These nested specifications are tested by subtracting the 
distance function of the incrementally restricted model (A) from that of the less restricted 
model (B).  The resulting test statistic ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( A B ψ ψ JD JD −  follows a chi-squared 
distribution with df = dfBB
B - dfBA
B. 
  Restricting the impact of the random effect to be constant over time leads to the 
test statistic  1121
2
) 24 ( = χ , which is considerably larger than the critical value 36 at the 5% 
level of significance.  Likewise, the restriction that the random effect is orthogonal to the 
regressors in the model is also soundly rejected at the 5% level of significance.  In that 
case the test statistic is  1379
2
) 63 ( = χ  and critical value 83.TP
11
PT  Therefore, both of the 
incremental restrictions on the model commonly assumed to hold in other studies are 
rejected using our data sample.   14
Elasticity Estimates 
 Expenditure  elasticities  for the correlated random effects (CRE) model are 
reported in Table 2 along with their standard errors.TP
12
PT  We also report estimates from the 
CRE model with the δ parameters restricted to unity, and the estimates from a cross 
sectional (CS) model where the three years of panel data are pooled and the demand 
system estimated without a random effect.  The percentage change in the magnitude of 
expenditure elasticities between full CRE and restricted CRE are reported to demonstrate 
the potential bias associated with more restrictive estimators that do not allow the impact 
of the household specific effect to vary over time, such as the conventional fixed effects 
specification.  Likewise, differences between the CS and CRE model can be primarily 
attributed to biases induced by an inability to control for household heterogeneity in 
preferences (omitted variable bias).  Since this is not a Monte Carlo study the observed 
biases are not generalizable, rather, the results provide an indication of the expected 
difference in elasticities estimated using a typical household panel. 
In general, the CRE expenditure elasticities are consistent with prior expectations 
and show the staple foods bread and grain are fairly unresponsive to income changes, 
while luxuries such as gasoline, diesel fuel, and other nonfood goods are highly 
responsive.  Restricting the impact of the random effect to be time invariant leads, for the 
most part, to elasticities that under-estimate those of the more flexible specification, by 
nearly 5 percent on average.TP
13
PT  In contrast, most of the CS estimates exceed those from 
the CRE model, with the magnitude of the divergence surpassing 20 percent in the case 
of bread, fruits and vegetables, coffee, and the meat, dairy, oils, and fats groups.  In fact, 
the average differential between CRE and CS elasticities is over three times that of the 
restricted CRE model at 16 percent. Most of the own-price elasticities associated with the three models reported in 
Table 3 are also within the expected magnitudes.  However, we were surprised to find the 
grains elasticity above unity, and the own-price responsiveness of beer is higher in 
Romania than has been documented for other countries.  Nonetheless, the other alcohol 
elasticities are similar to those found elsewhere in the commodity demand literature 
(Leung and Phelps; Smith).  The tobacco elasticity is larger than estimates for the U.S. 
and U.K., but falls within the -0.6 to -0.8 range reported for less developed countries 
(Chaloupka and Jha). 
We find clear differences in own-price elasticities between the CRE model and 
both the restricted CRE and CS models, although there is no clear pattern of over- or 
under-estimation in this case.  The restricted CRE estimates deviate from the more 
flexible specification by 7 percent, due in part to the large over-estimation of the own-
price responsiveness of tobacco.  The deviation in CS own-price elasticities from the 
CRE model, at approximately 12 percent, is somewhat less than observed for the 
expenditure elasticities.  The largest differential occurs for wine, which is over-estimated 
by the CS model by 29 percent.        
When the CS cross-price elasticities are compared to those generated by the CRE 
model, it is also changes in the price of wine that lead to the greatest elasticity 
differentials.  The CRE and CS estimates for all of the commodity groups are reported in 
Table 4 with their standard errors.  While the overall median differential between the two 
estimators is 140 percent, changes in the wine price generate demand responses in the CS 
model that differ by 389 percent from the CRE model.  Since some of the cross-price 
elasticities are imprecisely estimated, differences in degrees of freedom between the 
estimators and sample variability play a greater role in the comparison of specifications 
  15than they do for expenditure and own-price elasticities.  However, there are a variety of 
sizable differences in the cross-price effects even for statistically significant elasticities.    
Summary and Conclusions           
This study develops a framework to exploit the rich information content of 
longitudinal data in the estimation of large, disaggregated demand systems.  Censoring of 
the dependent variables makes maximum likelihood estimation of these systems difficult 
with cross sectional data and infeasible for panels with even a small number of time 
periods.  Therefore, a consistent and asymptotically efficient GMM estimator is used to 
identify the parameters of an empirical specification consistent with the random utility 
hypothesis and flexible enough to nest a variety of different models of household 
heterogeneity.  First, estimates of reduced form parameters are obtained from linear 
regressions and non-linear heteroscedastic Tobit models.  The minimum distance 
estimator is then used to identify the underlying structural parameters, impose economic 
restriction on the model, and test for more restrictive specifications of the household 
specific effect.  The most appropriate model allows the impact of the household specific 
random effect to vary over time, a generalization rarely tested for in the applied literature. 
When the resulting elasticity estimates are compared to those from a more 
restrictive correlated random effects model where the household specific effect is 
assumed to be time invariant, average differences in the expenditure and own-price 
elasticities are found to be 5 and 7 percent.  This suggests the bias associated with 
specifications that allow the random/fixed effect to be freely correlated with the 
regressors, but do not allow for time dependency, may not be substantial.  However, 
when the more flexible specification is compared to a cross sectional model estimated on 
pooled data, average differences in expenditure and own-price elasticities are between 12 
  16  17
and 16 percent.  In addition, substantial differences in cross-price elasticities are found, 
suggesting that the inability to control for heterogeneous preferences and unit-value 






PT Further, assume that  )     (⋅ U  is strongly separable over time, monotonic, and strictly quasi-concave in q .  
TP
2
PTTo avoid confusion in the notation, total expenditures will always be referred to in logarithmic form as 
jt x log , while the vector  t x′ is as defined above. 
TP
3
PT Chavas and Segerson have shown heteroscedasticity in share equation disturbances to be a general 
property of all specifications derived from a random objective function. 
TP
4
PT Note that for the uncensored equations  . 0 = ζ  
TP
5
PT The term “quasi-maximum likelihood” has become more general since its use in the White reference.  
While our QLME approach falls into the class of GMM estimators, Yen, Lin, and Smallwood’s  QMLE 
does not.  The consistency of this class of estimators was established by Hansen.      
TP
6
PT Although the observed budget shares add up, the latent shares need not, so we do not impose the adding-
up on the system.  This should have little impact on the price coefficients since they sum to zero across 
equations by default once symmetry and homogeneity have been imposed. 
TP
7
PT The only commodity whose price cannot be computed from survey data is tobacco.  Therefore, we use the 
monthly national tobacco CPI derived by the Romanian National Institute for Statistics. 
TP
8
PT Dong, Shonkwiler, and Capps have developed a method to deal with this issue when unit values are used 
in lieu of prices.  Nonetheless, incorporating their methodology into our model would be technical 
challenging, and is left as an area of future research. 
TP
9
PT The only exception is the large drop in the gasoline and diesel fuel budget share in 1995, which coincides 




PT Headcount estimates from Meyerhoefer (2001) put the percentage of the population living in poverty in 
1994-96 between 25 and 30 percent, depending on the method used to compute the poverty line.  
TP
11
PT Although these tests were conducted conditional on the joint imposition of symmetry and homogeneity, 
the demand theory restrictions (taken together) are rejected by the data.  Conducting the tests without the 
prior imposition of symmetry and homogeneity produces test statistics of 1159 and 1383, respectively, 
which also lead to rejection. 
TP
12
PT All of the reported standard errors were computed using the delta method, which was solved analytically 
or numerically by means of a finite differences method. 
TP
13
PT Imposing equality on the time period specific disturbance variances from the gasoline and diesel fuel 
equations leads to estimation problems in the CREP
δ=1
P model.  Therefore, we estimated the model while 
restricting the disturbance variance to the arithmetic average of the time period specific estimates.  As a 
result, the gasoline and diesel fuel elasticities for CRE and CREP
δ=1
P are not directly comparable. 
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  20Table 1. Average Budget Shares and Degree of Censoring
Commodity 94 95 96 94 95 96
Bread 7.2 6.8 7.0 2.4 0.6 0.6
Grains 3.3 2.8 3.2 1.9 0.7 1.2
Fruits, Vegetables 12.6 15.7 14.7 0.2 0.1 0.1
Meat, Dairy, Oils, Fats 26.0 27.0 27.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
Other foods 7.8 8.3 8.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
Coffee 1.2 1.3 1.2 50.8 45.3 44.0
Beer 0.6 0.7 0.6 73.4 69.8 72.6
Wine 1.8 2.0 2.2 56.8 56.0 57.1
Liqueur 1.1 1.1 1.1 57.8 51.9 53.4
Tobacco products 1.4 1.3 1.5 62.9 64.1 66.3
Gasoline, Diesel fuel 0.1 0.04 0.1 86.1 85.6 85.0
Nonfoods 36.4 32.9 32.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
Average Budget Share % of Zero Budget Shares
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Table 2. Expenditure Elasticities  (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Commodity n CRE CRE
δ=1 CS %∆ CRE
δ=1 %∆ CS
from CRE from CRE
Bread 0.339 0.315 0.465 -7.1 37.2
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Grains 0.441 0.404 0.453 -8.4 2.7
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Fruits, Vegetables 0.633 0.621 0.771 -1.9 21.8
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Meat, Dairy, Oils, 0.653 0.655 0.807 0.3 23.6
Fats (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Other Foods 0.759 0.757 0.880 -0.3 15.9
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Coffee 0.753 0.732 0.926 -2.8 23.0
(0.023) (0.022) (0.026)
Beer 0.851 0.824 0.976 -3.2 14.7
(0.041) (0.038) (0.033)
Wine 0.877 0.820 0.891 -6.5 1.6
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033)
Liqueur 0.804 0.736 0.760 -8.5 -5.5
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Tobacco Products 0.939 0.840 0.822 -10.5 -12.5
(0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
Gasoline, Diesel 1.811 2.291 2.048 26.5 13.1
Fuel (0.073) (0.018) (0.069)
Nonfoods 1.670 1.666 1.436 -0.2 -14.0
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
*Excludes Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Average 4.5* 15.5  
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Table 3. Own-Price Elasticities  (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Commodity n CRE CRE
δ=1 CS %∆ |CRE
δ=1|% ∆ |CS|
from |CRE| from |CRE|
Bread -0.482 -0.489 -0.481 1.5 -0.2
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030)
Grains -1.039 -1.000 -1.190 -3.8 14.5
(0.044) (0.045) (0.058)
Fruits, Vegetables -0.922 -0.901 -0.718 -2.3 -22.1
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Meat, Dairy, Oils, -0.717 -0.660 -0.606 -7.9 -15.5
Fats (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
Other Foods -0.964 -0.915 -1.031 -5.1 7.0
(0.032) (0.032) (0.038)
Coffee -0.955 -0.998 -1.083 4.5 13.4
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030)
Beer -1.246 -1.207 -1.297 -3.1 4.1
(0.101) (0.099) (0.081)
Wine -1.195 -1.100 -1.536 -7.9 28.5
(0.053) (0.053) (0.046)
Liqueur -1.140 -1.151 -1.137 1.0 -0.3
(0.053) (0.055) (0.053)
Tobacco Products -0.666 -0.900 -0.569 35.1 -14.6
(0.146) (0.145) (0.082)
Gasoline, Diesel -0.812 -0.732 -0.768 -9.9 -5.4
Fuel (0.043) (0.026) (0.036)
Nonfoods -0.994 -0.953 -0.837 -4.1 -15.8
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
*Excludes Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Average* 6.9 11.8
 Table 4. Price Elasticity Matrices (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
CRE CS CRE CS CRE CS CRE CS
Bread -0.482 -0.481 0.079 0.166 0.011 0.117 0.018 -0.385
(0.023) (0.030) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.037) (0.040)
Grains 0.171 0.373 -1.039 -1.190 0.161 0.277 -0.023 -0.627
(0.029) (0.038) (0.044) (0.058) (0.035) (0.039) (0.067) (0.074)
Fruits, Vegetables -0.015 0.036 0.029 0.050 -0.922 -0.718 0.121 -0.087
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
Meat, Dairy, Oils,  -0.017 -0.125 -0.009 -0.084 0.062 -0.052 -0.717 -0.606
Fats (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.026)
Other Foods 0.006 0.064 0.032 0.030 0.194 0.162 0.060 0.161
(0.018) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.043)
Coffee -0.107 -0.165 0.111 0.084 -0.082 -0.034 0.120 -0.095
(0.038) (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) (0.053) (0.047) (0.079) (0.070)
Beer -0.066 -0.174 -0.334 0.107 -0.355 0.035 0.533 0.327
(0.075) (0.065) (0.060) (0.056) (0.095) (0.073) (0.153) (0.116)
Wine -0.077 0.121 -0.028 -0.065 -0.144 0.086 -0.156 0.016
(0.029) (0.023) (0.018) (0.015) (0.045) (0.033) (0.061) (0.045)
Liqueur 0.018 -0.204 -0.040 -0.068 -0.036 -0.268 -0.101 0.405
(0.047) (0.048) (0.036) (0.039) (0.066) (0.056) (0.100) (0.091)
Tobacco Products -0.122 0.225 0.356 0.504 -0.110 -0.531 -0.607 -0.176
(0.060) (0.045) (0.049) (0.036) (0.078) (0.056) (0.134) (0.085)
Gasoline, Diesel -0.051 -0.071 -0.057 -0.029 0.099 -0.087 -0.373 -0.313
Fuel (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.036) (0.031) (0.054) (0.047)
Nonfoods -0.087 -0.089 -0.043 -0.038 -0.131 -0.120 -0.269 -0.072
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Median %∆
Bread Grains Fruits, Vegetables Meat, Dairy, Oils, Fats
257.1 70.0 159.7 168.3Table 4. Continued
CRE CS CRE CS CRE CS CRE CS
Bread 0.041 0.108 -0.019 -0.039 -0.001 -0.036 -0.006 0.105
(0.021) (0.026) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014)
Grains 0.110 0.113 0.072 0.067 -0.158 0.083 -0.002 -0.066
(0.038) (0.050) (0.013) (0.015) (0.030) (0.037) (0.017) (0.021)
Fruits, Vegetables 0.120 0.101 -0.005 0.001 -0.028 0.017 -0.009 0.048
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Meat, Dairy, Oils,  0.027 0.055 0.013 -0.002 0.044 0.037 0.004 0.023
Fats (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Other Foods -0.964 -1.031 -0.001 -0.013 -0.044 -0.048 0.062 0.072
(0.032) (0.038) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016)
Coffee -0.020 -0.070 -0.955 -1.083 0.002 0.031 0.055 0.269
(0.050) (0.048) (0.034) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Beer -0.279 -0.241 -0.006 0.027 -1.246 -1.297 0.212 0.087
(0.091) (0.076) (0.042) (0.034) (0.101) (0.081) (0.061) (0.050)
Wine 0.114 0.097 -0.156 0.122 0.114 0.041 -1.195 -1.536
(0.037) (0.031) (0.020) (0.016) (0.033) (0.025) (0.053) (0.046)
Liqueur 0.060 -0.205 -0.006 -0.021 0.229 0.148 -0.007 0.100
(0.063) (0.062) (0.027) (0.025) (0.048) (0.045) (0.038) (0.036)
Tobacco Products -0.045 -0.234 -0.002 -0.011 -0.180 -0.233 0.193 0.157
(0.077) (0.057) (0.035) (0.025) (0.063) (0.045) (0.047) (0.041)
Gasoline, Diesel -0.228 -0.116 -0.050 -0.043 0.105 0.030 -0.128 -0.227
Fuel (0.027) (0.025) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) (0.021) (0.033) (0.034)
Nonfoods -0.093 -0.228 -0.013 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019 -0.035
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Median %∆
Other Foods Coffee Beer Wine
103.7 120.0 64.0 389.1Table 4. Continued
CRE CS CRE CS CRE CS CRE CS
Bread 0.020 -0.056 -0.034 0.132 0.005 0.004 0.030 -0.099
(0.012) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Grains -0.012 -0.039 0.352 0.625 -0.021 0.005 -0.052 -0.074
(0.022) (0.029) (0.045) (0.042) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
Fruits, Vegetables 0.007 -0.035 -0.010 -0.137 0.037 0.011 0.041 -0.059
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Meat, Dairy, Oils,  0.004 0.045 -0.054 -0.021 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 -0.075
Fats (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Other Foods 0.025 -0.052 -0.005 -0.106 -0.046 -0.008 -0.078 -0.112
(0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.026) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Coffee -0.001 -0.021 0.002 -0.022 -0.052 -0.034 -0.094 -0.024
(0.030) (0.029) (0.060) (0.048) (0.020) (0.015) (0.029) (0.025)
Beer 0.278 0.170 -0.339 -0.449 0.160 0.039 -0.165 -0.166
(0.058) (0.049) (0.118) (0.080) (0.036) (0.022) (0.051) (0.036)
Wine 0.027 0.051 0.115 0.128 -0.004 -0.109 0.185 -0.317
(0.025) (0.020) (0.048) (0.036) (0.026) (0.018) (0.040) (0.031)
Liqueur -1.140 -1.137 -0.036 0.023 -0.105 -0.001 -0.228 -0.051
(0.053) (0.053) (0.074) (0.059) (0.025) (0.017) (0.036) (0.027)
Tobacco Products -0.023 0.017 -0.666 -0.569 0.005 -0.088 -0.057 -0.099
(0.047) (0.036) (0.146) (0.082) (0.026) (0.020) (0.037) (0.031)
Gasoline, Diesel -0.094 -0.011 -0.004 -0.157 -0.812 -0.768 -0.218 -0.255
Fuel (0.021) (0.018) (0.032) (0.034) (0.043) (0.036) (0.058) (0.052)
Nonfoods -0.013 -0.002 -0.007 -0.016 0.001 0.005 -0.994 -0.837
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Median %∆
Gasoline, Diesel Fuel Nonfoods Liqueur Tobacco Products
225.0 163.9 83.3 74.5  